kirill
2004-02-07 14:25:07 UTC
February 6, 2004
WARREN ZIMMERMANN (1934-2004)
A DIPLOMAT WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS
by Srdja Trifkovic
Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia before its breakup and civil war, died on February 3 of pancreatic cancer at the age of 69. Zimmermann, a career
Foreign Service officer, was named ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1989 by the first President Bush. Zimmermann was recalled from Belgrade in 1992 when U.N. sanctions were
imposed on what remained of Yugoslavia, and two years later he resigned from the Foreign Service over what he felt was President Clintons reluctance to intervene
forcefully enough on the Muslim side in the Bosnian war. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Zimmermann ranked among the finest U.S. career ambassadors and described him
as an eloquent defender of human rights: Ambassador Zimmermann's passing is a great loss to American diplomacy and to our State Department family.
What the obituaries do not state, however, is that in March 1992 Warren Zimmermann materially contributedprobably more than any other single manto the outbreak of the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The facts of the case have been established beyond reasonable doubt and are no longer dosputed by experts.
Nine months earlier, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, a move that triggered off a short war in Slovenia and a sustained conflict in Croatia where
the Serbs refused to accept Tudjmans fait accompli. These events had profound consequences on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Yugoslavia in miniature. The Serbs adamantly
opposed the idea of Bosnian independence. The Croats predictably rejected any suggestion that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia. Alija
Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader, had decided as early as September 1990 he argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina should also declare independence if Slovenia and Croatia secede. On
27 February 1991 he went a step further by declaring in the Assembly: I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
I would not sacrifice sovereignty. The process culminated with the referendum on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (29 February 1992). The Serbs duly boycotted it,
determined not to become a minority in a Muslim-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the end just over 62 percent of voters opted for independence, overwhelmingly Muslims and
Croats; but even this figure was short of the two-thirds majority required by the constitution. This did not stop the rump government of Izetbegovic from declaring
independence on 3 March.
Simultaneously one last attempt was under way to save peace. The Portuguese foreign minister José CutileiroPortugal holding at that time the EC Presidencyorganized a
conference in Lisbon attended by the three communities leaders, Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, and the Croat leader Mate Boban. The EU mediators persuaded the three sides
that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be independent but internally organized on the basis of ethnic regions or cantons.
The breakthrough was due to the Bosnian Serbs acceptance of an independent and internationally recognized state, provided that the Muslims give up their ambition of a
centralized, unitary one. Izetbegovic appeared to accept that this was the best deal he could makebut soon he was to change his mind, thanks to Warren Zimmermann. When
Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Zimmermann flew post haste from Belgrade to Sarajevo to tell him that the U.S. did not stand behind the Cutileiro plan. He saw it as a
means to a Serbian power grab that could be prevented only by internationalizing the problem. When Izetbegovic said that he did not like the Lisbon agreement, Zimmerrmann
remembered later, I told him, if he didnt like it, why sign it? A high-ranking State Department official subsequently admitted that the US policy was to encourage
Izetbegovic to break with the partition plan. The New York Times (August 29, 1993) brought a revealing quote from the key player himself:
The embassy [in Belgrade] was for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from sometime in February on, Mr. Zimmermann said of his policy recommendation from Belgrade.
Meaning me. ... Immediately after Mr. Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann called on him in Sarajevo... "He said he didnt like it; I told him, if he didnt
like it, why sign it?"
After that moment Izetbegovic had no motive to take the ongoing EC-brokered talks seriously. Only had Washington and Brussels jointly insisted on an agreement on the
confederal-cantonal blueprint as a precondition for recognition, he could have been induced to support the Cutileiro plan. But after his encounter with Zimmermann
Izetbegovic felt authorized to renege on tripartite accord, and he believed that the U.S. administration would come to his assistance to enforce the independence of a
unitary Bosnian state.
The motives of Zimmermann and his political bosses in Washington were not rooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeed any higher moral principle.
Their policy had no basis in the law of nations, or in the notions of truth or justice. It was the end-result of the interaction of pressure groups within the American
power structure: Saudis and other Muslims, neocons, Turks, One-World Nation Builders, Russophobes all had their field day. Thus the war in the Balkans evolved from a
Yugoslav disaster and a European inconvenience into a major test of U.S. leadership. This was made possible by a bogus consensus which passed for Europe's Balkan policy.
This consensus, amplified in the media, limited the scope for meningful debate. Europe was thus unable to resist the new thrust of Bosnian policy coming from Washington.
While Europe resorted to the lowest common denominator in lieu of coherent policy, Zimmermann was giving finishing touches to a virulently anti-Serb, agenda-driven form of
Realpolitik that was to dominate Americas Bosnian policy. Just as Germany sought to paint its Maastricht Diktat on Croatias recognition in December 1991 as an expression
of the European consensus, after Zimmermanns intervention in Sarajevo Washingtons fait accomplis were straightfacedly labeled as the will of the international
community. Just as the EU has lived with the consequences of its acquiescence to Herr Genscher's fist-banging in Maastricht, Europe has felt the brunt of the new American
agenda in foreign policy. It was resentful but helpless when the United States resorted to covert actionwith the support of Turkey and Germanyto smuggle arms into Croatia
and Bosnia in violation of U.N. resolutions. Zimmermanns torpedoing of the EU Lisbon formula in 1992 started a trend that frustrated the Europeans, but they were helpless.
Cutileiro was embittered by the US action and accused Izetbegovic of reneging on the agreement. Had the Muslims not done so, he recalled in 1995, the Bosnian question
might have been settled earlier, with less loss of life and land. Cutileiro also noted that the decision to renege on the signed agreement was not only Izetbegovics, as
he was encouraged to scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by foreign mediators. This was echoed by Ambassador Bissett, who has opined that the United
States undermined every peace initiative that might have prevented the killing: It appeared that the United States was determined to pursue a policy that prevented a
resolution of the conflict by other than violent means.
More than a decade after the event it cannot be denied that Warren Zimmermanns role in Bosnias descent to war was crucial. In early 1992 most Muslims were prepared to
accept a compromise that would fall short of full independenceespecially if full independence risked warbut he encouraged Izetbegovic to take a leap in the dark.
Zimmermanns subsequent role as an advocate of a military intervention on the side of the Muslims was seedy but predictable; ditto the lies, half-truths and distortions
contained in his book on the Yugoslav conflict (Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers). The Washington Times was wrong when it claimed in an otherwise
insightful piece that the Lisbon agreement was scuttled by hapless Mr. Zimmermann, who encouraged [Izetbegovic] to reverse himself and withdraw. In reality there was
nothing hapless about Zimmermanns action. It was as coldly premeditated, and as tragic in its consequences, as Bismarcks game with the Ems telegram in 1870, or William
Walkers stage-managed massacre at Racak in January 1999, or Albrights cynical setup at Rambouillet a month later. No doubt when these two eloquent defenders of human
rights meet their maker the Secretary of State of the day will also assure us that their passing is a great loss to American diplomacy and to our State Department
family.
WARREN ZIMMERMANN (1934-2004)
A DIPLOMAT WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS
by Srdja Trifkovic
Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia before its breakup and civil war, died on February 3 of pancreatic cancer at the age of 69. Zimmermann, a career
Foreign Service officer, was named ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1989 by the first President Bush. Zimmermann was recalled from Belgrade in 1992 when U.N. sanctions were
imposed on what remained of Yugoslavia, and two years later he resigned from the Foreign Service over what he felt was President Clintons reluctance to intervene
forcefully enough on the Muslim side in the Bosnian war. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Zimmermann ranked among the finest U.S. career ambassadors and described him
as an eloquent defender of human rights: Ambassador Zimmermann's passing is a great loss to American diplomacy and to our State Department family.
What the obituaries do not state, however, is that in March 1992 Warren Zimmermann materially contributedprobably more than any other single manto the outbreak of the war
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The facts of the case have been established beyond reasonable doubt and are no longer dosputed by experts.
Nine months earlier, in June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, a move that triggered off a short war in Slovenia and a sustained conflict in Croatia where
the Serbs refused to accept Tudjmans fait accompli. These events had profound consequences on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that Yugoslavia in miniature. The Serbs adamantly
opposed the idea of Bosnian independence. The Croats predictably rejected any suggestion that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains within a Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia. Alija
Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader, had decided as early as September 1990 he argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina should also declare independence if Slovenia and Croatia secede. On
27 February 1991 he went a step further by declaring in the Assembly: I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
I would not sacrifice sovereignty. The process culminated with the referendum on independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (29 February 1992). The Serbs duly boycotted it,
determined not to become a minority in a Muslim-dominated Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the end just over 62 percent of voters opted for independence, overwhelmingly Muslims and
Croats; but even this figure was short of the two-thirds majority required by the constitution. This did not stop the rump government of Izetbegovic from declaring
independence on 3 March.
Simultaneously one last attempt was under way to save peace. The Portuguese foreign minister José CutileiroPortugal holding at that time the EC Presidencyorganized a
conference in Lisbon attended by the three communities leaders, Izetbegovic, Radovan Karadzic, and the Croat leader Mate Boban. The EU mediators persuaded the three sides
that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be independent but internally organized on the basis of ethnic regions or cantons.
The breakthrough was due to the Bosnian Serbs acceptance of an independent and internationally recognized state, provided that the Muslims give up their ambition of a
centralized, unitary one. Izetbegovic appeared to accept that this was the best deal he could makebut soon he was to change his mind, thanks to Warren Zimmermann. When
Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Zimmermann flew post haste from Belgrade to Sarajevo to tell him that the U.S. did not stand behind the Cutileiro plan. He saw it as a
means to a Serbian power grab that could be prevented only by internationalizing the problem. When Izetbegovic said that he did not like the Lisbon agreement, Zimmerrmann
remembered later, I told him, if he didnt like it, why sign it? A high-ranking State Department official subsequently admitted that the US policy was to encourage
Izetbegovic to break with the partition plan. The New York Times (August 29, 1993) brought a revealing quote from the key player himself:
The embassy [in Belgrade] was for recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina from sometime in February on, Mr. Zimmermann said of his policy recommendation from Belgrade.
Meaning me. ... Immediately after Mr. Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann called on him in Sarajevo... "He said he didnt like it; I told him, if he didnt
like it, why sign it?"
After that moment Izetbegovic had no motive to take the ongoing EC-brokered talks seriously. Only had Washington and Brussels jointly insisted on an agreement on the
confederal-cantonal blueprint as a precondition for recognition, he could have been induced to support the Cutileiro plan. But after his encounter with Zimmermann
Izetbegovic felt authorized to renege on tripartite accord, and he believed that the U.S. administration would come to his assistance to enforce the independence of a
unitary Bosnian state.
The motives of Zimmermann and his political bosses in Washington were not rooted in the concern for the Muslims of Bosnia as such, or indeed any higher moral principle.
Their policy had no basis in the law of nations, or in the notions of truth or justice. It was the end-result of the interaction of pressure groups within the American
power structure: Saudis and other Muslims, neocons, Turks, One-World Nation Builders, Russophobes all had their field day. Thus the war in the Balkans evolved from a
Yugoslav disaster and a European inconvenience into a major test of U.S. leadership. This was made possible by a bogus consensus which passed for Europe's Balkan policy.
This consensus, amplified in the media, limited the scope for meningful debate. Europe was thus unable to resist the new thrust of Bosnian policy coming from Washington.
While Europe resorted to the lowest common denominator in lieu of coherent policy, Zimmermann was giving finishing touches to a virulently anti-Serb, agenda-driven form of
Realpolitik that was to dominate Americas Bosnian policy. Just as Germany sought to paint its Maastricht Diktat on Croatias recognition in December 1991 as an expression
of the European consensus, after Zimmermanns intervention in Sarajevo Washingtons fait accomplis were straightfacedly labeled as the will of the international
community. Just as the EU has lived with the consequences of its acquiescence to Herr Genscher's fist-banging in Maastricht, Europe has felt the brunt of the new American
agenda in foreign policy. It was resentful but helpless when the United States resorted to covert actionwith the support of Turkey and Germanyto smuggle arms into Croatia
and Bosnia in violation of U.N. resolutions. Zimmermanns torpedoing of the EU Lisbon formula in 1992 started a trend that frustrated the Europeans, but they were helpless.
Cutileiro was embittered by the US action and accused Izetbegovic of reneging on the agreement. Had the Muslims not done so, he recalled in 1995, the Bosnian question
might have been settled earlier, with less loss of life and land. Cutileiro also noted that the decision to renege on the signed agreement was not only Izetbegovics, as
he was encouraged to scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by foreign mediators. This was echoed by Ambassador Bissett, who has opined that the United
States undermined every peace initiative that might have prevented the killing: It appeared that the United States was determined to pursue a policy that prevented a
resolution of the conflict by other than violent means.
More than a decade after the event it cannot be denied that Warren Zimmermanns role in Bosnias descent to war was crucial. In early 1992 most Muslims were prepared to
accept a compromise that would fall short of full independenceespecially if full independence risked warbut he encouraged Izetbegovic to take a leap in the dark.
Zimmermanns subsequent role as an advocate of a military intervention on the side of the Muslims was seedy but predictable; ditto the lies, half-truths and distortions
contained in his book on the Yugoslav conflict (Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers). The Washington Times was wrong when it claimed in an otherwise
insightful piece that the Lisbon agreement was scuttled by hapless Mr. Zimmermann, who encouraged [Izetbegovic] to reverse himself and withdraw. In reality there was
nothing hapless about Zimmermanns action. It was as coldly premeditated, and as tragic in its consequences, as Bismarcks game with the Ems telegram in 1870, or William
Walkers stage-managed massacre at Racak in January 1999, or Albrights cynical setup at Rambouillet a month later. No doubt when these two eloquent defenders of human
rights meet their maker the Secretary of State of the day will also assure us that their passing is a great loss to American diplomacy and to our State Department
family.